In this paper, we focus on the determinants of the relationship between aid and corruption. We propose a static principal-agent model where a donor faces the problem of giving aid to a recipient country characterized by wide spread corruption. The model describes four possible equilibria: one, in which foreign aid is set by the donor independently of the level of corruption and a second one, where the donor uses aid to induce the "right" incentives on local elites. In the third and forth equilibria, the donor either cannot impose an incentive mechanism or prefers not to. In these last two cases, the aid-corruption relationship depends only on the preferences of the donor.
Introduction
Corruption is a very serious problem, particularly widespread in developing countries 1 . It aggravates poverty by having a significant and detrimental impact on the lives of the poor; it reduces their net income and wrecks the programs related to their basic needs. In societies where corruption and clientelism are pervasive, competition is severely distorted and, in the long run, corruption not only affects the distribution of resources, but also the process of economic growth, encouraging people to apply their skills and energies in non productive ways 2 . Last but not least, the phenomenon of corruption is also capable of frustrating the efforts of aid agencies in their fight against poverty and underdevelopment.
There is today an increased awareness of the development community 3 , in both donor and recipient countries, that without countering corruption, aid is in danger of not achieving its goals, failing to reach the poor or just reaching them partially. Regardless of the general agreement on the relevance of this issue, and despite the many declarations of intent, do actually donors take the problem of corruption into account in their development policies?
Surprisingly, although the issue is at the center of the debate and anectodical evidence 4 suggests that corruption is capable of reducing aid effectiveness, rigorous studies on the attitude of donors toward corruption are relatively few. To our knowledge, the only paper that provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of the aid-corruption relationship is Alesina and Weder (2002) . These authors show that, for most donors, corruption is not a significant explanatory variable in bilateral aid allocation. Only for Australia and Sweden they find evidence that low corruption is rewarded with higher levels of aid, while the USA seem to give more aid to more corrupt recipients.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we provide new evidence on the aidcorruption issue, not only by reassessing and updating the Alesina-Weder results, but also by showing how the link between aid and corruption has evolved in the last two decades. Second, and more importantly, we try to provide a structural interpretation of the evidence. With the help of a simple model of aid allocation under moral hazard, we ask what are the motives behind donors' attitudes toward corruption in developing countries.
The literature on aid allocation has mainly aimed at detecting empirically the factors behind donors' aid policies 5 . Traditionally, this literature has focused on the dichotomy between strategic-economic interests and recipient needs but has ignored the information/incentive problems that are often encountered by donors in the actual implemen-1 According to the Corruption Perception Index (2006) almost three-quarters of the countries (including all low-income countries and all but two African states) score below five and seventy one countries (nearly half) score below three.
2 See for example Mauro, (1995) . 3 The global consensus on this objective is reflected by the ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The need to fight corruption is also an important part of the Millennium Development Goals and of the global Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process of the World Bank and the IMF. 4 For some interesting examples on the issue of aid and corruption in Africa, see Cooksey (2003) . 5 See among others, McGillivray, 1989; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dollar and Collier, 1999. tation of development projects. Corruption and rent seeking in developing countries, in fact, are usually the result of moral hazard, arising from the ability of corrupt bureaucrats to exploit their authority for private gains. Since, in this type of environment, donors could actually intervene through an appropriate contract design, an important question is whether aid is used as an instrument to provide the right incentives to local elites. In this paper, therefore, we consider a theoretical model where donors not only give aid on the basis of altruistic or strategic/ economic considerations, but take into account also incentive issues. The model has four possible equilibria. In the first one, the donor does not perceive the existence of a significant moral hazard problem, and grants aid according to its preferences, regardless of the level of corruption in the recipient country. In the second equilibrium, the donor tries to influence the behavior of local elites by offering incentive compatible contracts: the optimal amount of aid is an increasing function of the level of corruption. Allowing some diversion of resources, in fact, may be used as a mean to compensate local elites for their effort and induce them to work toward the success of development projects.
The third and fourth equilibria are obtained, instead, when a donor does not impose an incentive mechanism, either because he does not want to, given its strategic/economic interests, or because it cannot impose it. In the third equilibrium, we can actually distinguish between two different cases. If donors prefer to favor local elites for geopolitical factors, then aid is increasing in the level of corruption. If instead donors are sincerely motivated by recipients need, then corruption is a decreasing function of aid. The fourth equilibrium describes an environment where corruption is perceived as excessively high: in this case, an altruistic donor could find optimal to ration aid. The results of the model are then used to provide a structural interpretation of the empirical analysis.
For the fourteen major donors, during the period 1985-2006, we estimate a Tobit model of aid allocation. Our regressions show that all donors included in the sample are motivated by a mix of altruistic and economic-strategic considerations. Most donors give aid to poorer and more democratic recipients. However, as already documented by the aid allocation literature, colonial and political ties and trade relationships are also important factors in determining the volume of aid to any specific recipient country 6 .
When we consider the relationship between aid and corruption, we find large differences among donors. Scandinavian countries tend to give more aid, ceteris paribus, to less corrupt recipients. According to our model this negative correlation between the size of aid and the level of corruption characterizes unambiguously a situation where donors know that they can hardly affect the decisions of the elite but are highly interested in helping the poor. Knowing that in more corrupt countries resources will be diverted from their intended use, these donors tend to concentrate aid to the less corrupt ones. Our findings are in line with the existing literature that usually label those donors as altruistic. Beside the Scandinavian countries a negative relationship between aid and corruption can be also found in some equations for Germany and Japan.
Consistent with the first equilibrium of our model, instead, are the results for the UK, Australia and the Netherlands, where the level of corruption is not significant in explaining aid. For these donors, the level of corruption in the recipient country is not very important in determining aid, either because its level is acceptable or because they perceive it as acceptable.
There is, finally, a third group of countries that includes the USA, Italy, France, Spain and Canada (although for the last three donors the level of significance is much lower) that appear to grant more aid, ceteris paribus, to more corrupt recipients. A positive sign in the relationship between aid and corruption is compatible either with the second equilibrium of the model, where donors try to use aid to provide incentives to the elites, and with the third equilibrium, where donors take corruption as given and are simply motivated by strategic-economic interests. For three out five countries of this group, other indicators of non-altruistic motives seem particularly relevant and this lead us to interpret the positive relationship between aid and corruption, more as the result of political and economic factors rather than the consequence of incentive considerations.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the empirical analysis. Last section concludes.
A Simple Model of Aid Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
We consider a bilateral cooperation program 7 between two countries: a donor and a recipient 8 , where the government of the donor country decides the amount of resources, a, that should be devoted to implement a development project in the recipient country 9 . The recipient country is inhabited by a continuum of agents with unit mass. Agents are divided in two groups: type I agents, that we also call the elite, and type II agents defined as the poor. Only the elite has access to a stochastic technology to influence the outcome of the project; the poor cannot affect this outcome but receive, at the end of the production process, a fraction of the output.
We assume that the distribution of the output inside the country is exogenous and reflects its institutional characteristics. The government of the recipient country is run by the elite which is able to capture a fraction γ of the output of the project. The poor receive instead the remaining (1 − γ).
Production is stochastic and is affected by the actions undertaken by type I agents. We assume that the output of the project is given by a standard neoclassical production function y = θf (a), where f (a) > 0, f (a) < 0, f (0) = 0, f (0) = ∞ and θ is a stochastic productivity parameter. Type I agents can undertake two types of actions 7 The bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows still represent the 75% of the sources of aid.
8 This paper abstracts from issues of inter-recipient competition for aid, by assuming that this feature may affect budget decision but not the aid allocation process itself.
9 A static model is obviously an over simplification with respect to reality, where usually there are repeated interactions between donors and recipients (see Isopi and Mattesini (2006) for example). i = 0 or i = 1. When i = 0, the agent undertakes the low level of effort, which implies a lower probability of success of the project; if i = 1, the agent undertakes the high level of effort which, however, implies for the agent a cost ψ expressed in terms of utility. We assume that the donor cannot observe the level of effort exerted by the elite and this gives rise to a moral hazard problem.
Depending on the action undertaken, output can assume the values {θf (a), θf (a)} with θ − θ= ∆θ > 0 and the stochastic influence of the agent's action on production is characterized by the probabilities P r(θ = θ | i = 0) = π 0 and P r(θ = θ | i = 1) = π 1 with π 1 > π 0 . Notice that effort improves production in the sense of first order stochastic dominance, i.e. P r(θ ≤ θ * | i) is decreasing in i for any given level of production θ * .
A crucial assumption of this model is that when a type I agent undertakes action i = 0, that we also denote as the bad action, he can also extract a private benefit, which is given by a further fraction b of the output in addition to the fraction γ to which he is entitled. We assume γ + b < 1. An agent that undertakes the bad action, therefore not only is able to save on the cost of effort, but is also able to divert a fraction of the available resources from their intended use. The private benefit b in this model is an indicator of the level of corruption in the economy. With this assumption, we want to stress the two main consequences of moral hazard in developing countries: on one side the costs that are generated by an inefficient involvement of the local elites in the realization of development projects (low level of effort), on the other side the appropriation of resources that could be employed in the project or transferred to the poor, which is outright corruption.
Assuming, to keep the analysis simple, that type I agents' utility u e is linear, we have
if they undertake the bad action and
if they undertake the good action. The utility function of type II agents, u p , depends on the final output of the project undertaken by the elite. We also assume a linear utility function for type II agents. The expected utility of the poor, therefore is given by:
if type I agents undertake the bad action and
if type I agents undertake the good action. The government of the donor country gives aid in order to enhance the development process in the recipient country. A major objective of the donor is to favor the poor and therefore, his utility is increasing in the welfare of type II agents. However, the form of the donor's utility function takes into account the effects that its actions have on the utility of type I agents which, in this model, have an active role in the production process. This intends to capture the idea that donors may not be entirely oriented toward the needs of the poor but may also desire to influence the elite of the recipient country for political and strategic/economic reasons.
Hence, the utility function of the donor will be a weighted average of the utility of the two social groups in the recipient country, minus the cost of giving aid, that is:
where
The parameter λ represents the weight that the donor assigns to the utility function of the elite of the recipient country. The cost function, which for simplicity we assume linear, represents the opportunity cost for the donor of giving foreign aid.
Notice that, in this model, the only variable which agents can contract on is the level of aid. In a situation characterized by moral hazard, where future punishments are excluded by the absence of repeated interactions, the choice of a must take into account the distortion created by asymmetric information.
Usually, in principal-agent models, the principal wishes that the agent undertakes the best level of effort and therefore, an optimal contract can be found by maximizing the principal's objective function under the assumption that the agent undertakes the good action. In our model, however, this is not necessarily true since the donor maximizes a weighted sum of the utility of type I agents and type II agents. In order to correctly specify the optimal contract, therefore, we must first determine whether it is optimal, for a donor, to always induce good behavior by type I agents (i.e. inducing type I agents to always exert the high level of effort).
A donor maximizes his utility under the assumption that type I agents undertake the high level of effort, if the overall utility he obtains in this case is greater than the utility he obtains when type I agents undertake the low level of effort, i.e. whether:
Defining, now,
after some simple algebra, (7) can be rewritten as:
If condition (8) is satisfied, substituting (1), (2) , (3), (4) and (6) into (5) the donor's maximization problem is given by:
where equation (11) is the individual rationality constraint (to ensure that the recipient will want to sign the contract); equation (10) represents the incentive compatibility constraint (to ensure that, once the contract is signed, it will be optimal for the elite to undertake the best action) and equation (12) is the non negativity constraint on a, which rules out the possibility of negative transfers. The solution to this problem will be an optimal aid contract if condition (8) is satisfied.
It is interesting to notice that (8) is always satisfied if λ = 0. In this case, a donor is not at all concerned about the welfare of the elite of the recipient country and therefore, never derives disutility from the effort undertaken by this social group. When instead a donor is also concerned about the welfare of the elite, i.e. λ > 0, he must weigh the elite's disutility of effort associated with undertaking the low level of effort.
There are instances, however, when the solution to problem (9)- (12) does not exist or, when it exists, does not define an optimal contract. This happens: i) if the solution to problem (9)- (12) does not satisfy condition (8) , i.e. the donor's utility function increases when the elite undertakes the bad action; ii) if (Φ 1 − Φ 0 )γ − Φ 0 b < 0, which implies that the set of contracts that satisfies (10) is always empty, in which case a donor will never be able to induce good behavior by offering an appropriate level of aid. In both cases the optimal level of aid is given by the solution to the following maximization problem: max
Denote, now, by
, by a * the optimal level of aid, and definite g(a) = f −1 (a). We can state the following:
≥ ψ, such that there always exists a level of aid at which both the donor and the elite of the recipient country are better off when i = 1 is chosen. Then we can have:
no incentive mechanism is necessary to induce high effort. The optimal level of aid is given by the first best equilibrium and is such that
B(γ, b) − ψ < 0, a donor will impose an incentive mechanism and the optimal level of aid is such that:
< ψ, such that it is not possible to find a level of aid at which both the donor and the elite of the recipient country are better off when i = 1 is chosen. In equilibrium, type I agents always choose a level of effort i = 0.
If
, it is always possible to find a positive level of aid where the benefits perceived by the donor are always greater then the costs induced by corruption. The optimal level of aid is given by:
Depending on the value of λ we have
< 0, the level of corruption is so high that the cost for the donor of giving aid never outweight the benefits. Then equilibrium implies aid rationing, i.e.:
Our model identifies four possible equilibria. The first two are obtained when it is possible to find a level of aid at which both the donor and the elite are better off when the elite undertakes the good action. The other two are obtained when such a level of aid can never be found, and imposing an incentive mechanism is never optimal, because is too costly and/or ineffective.
Let us first concentrate on equilibria 1 and 2, which will occur only when the composite parameter B(γ, b) > 0. In this case, the optimal contracts will be determined either by equilibrium 1 or by equilibrium 2 depending on the composite parameters F (γ, λ) and B(γ, b). Notice that F (γ, λ) = [λγ + (1 − γ)(1 − λ)] is the sum of two terms: i) the weight a donor assigns to the elite in his utility function multiplied by the share of output the elite receives and ii) the weight a donor assigns to the poor multiplied by the share of output the poor receive. The composite parameter B(γ, b) = (Φ 1 − Φ 0 )γ − Φ 0 b, instead, can be interpreted as the expected gain the elite obtains from undertaking the highest level of effort.
If equilibrium 1 prevails, the economy reaches the first best equilibrium. In this case, the net gain for the elite from undertaking i = 1 is always greater than the disutility of effort. In other words, the moral hazard issue is not relevant and the optimal contract is always incentive compatible, i.e. at this level of aid the local elite does not have any incentive to undertake the low level of effort and capture private benefits. Corruption, therefore, is not perceived by the donor as a problem, and the size of the aid transfer in this first equilibrium reflects only the preferences of the donor either for the elite, (λ), and toward the poor, (1-λ), the donor's marginal cost of giving aid, (δ) and the share of output that goes respectively to the elite (γ) and to the poor (1 − γ).
The second possible equilibrium of the model occurs when g
Technically, this result is obtained when the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. In this case, the donor induces type I agents to undertake the high level of effort by choosing an appropriate level of aid. In this equilibrium, the level of aid is not influenced by the donor's preferences but is increasing in the level of effort and decreasing in the composite parameter B(γ, b). Since B(γ, b) is decreasing in b, an increase in the private benefit will induce donors to grant a higher volume of aid. If the donor perceives that the local elite responds to incentives, and knows that type I agents will choose the good action only if they find it worthwhile, it will be optimal to provide a larger amount of aid the larger is the risk that effort is low and that aid is diverted. In this situation, where donors can only act on the size of the aid transfer, a donor is aware that the elite of the recipient country will work toward the success of the project only if the amount of aid is large and it is able to obtain a significant size of it. An increasing relationship between the size of aid and the private benefit may, therefore, be the consequence of a simple consideration: only by providing a sufficient amount of transfers it is possible to avoid the failure of aid programs, even if this implies rewarding excessively local elites.
The occurrence of equilibria 3 and 4 is due to two possible factors: either when B(γ, b) < 0 or/and when g
When B(γ, b) < 0 the private benefit the elites of the recipient country are able to extract is so high that there is no level of aid that guarantees incentive compatibility. Since it is not possible for the donor to induce type I agents to undertake the high level of effort, he reasonably determines the optimal amount of aid under the assumption that type I agents always undertake the low level of effort. When g (8) does not hold and donors find it optimal that type I agents undertake the low level of effort. This may happen, for example, because donors, for strategic/economic reasons may want to favor local elites by letting them enjoy higher private benefits or bear lower costs of effort. In both cases, the optimal contract is a solution to problem (13)- (14) . Equilibrium 3 implies a positive level of aid, while equilibrium 4 implies zero aid, i.e. aid rationing. The optimal level of aid defined by the third equilibrium depends crucially on the private benefit b and on the preferences of the donor country towards for the two social groups of the recipient country. If λ > 1 2 , then donor's utility is increasing in the welfare of type I agents and, as a consequence, the optimal level of aid is also an increasing function of the private benefit b. If instead λ < 1 2 , then a donor is mainly concerned about the effect of aid on the welfare of the poor, and since the higher is b the lower is the amount of resources that are going to reach the poor, aid will be a decreasing function of b.
In equilibrium 4, being λ < 1 2 , donors are again characterized by altruistic motivations but in this case the level of b is so high that donors prefer to deny aid to the recipient country: the donor is aware that most of the aid will be wasted, going only to enrich the local elites and therefore, optimality requires aid rationing.
Empirical Analysis

Definitions of Variables and Data Issues
In line with the empirical literature on foreign aid allocation, we study the motivations behind development assistance by regressing the Aid/GDP ratio, for each donor, on a series of explanatory variables that describe the main institutional and economic features of the recipients. Our sample covers 168 recipients and 14 donors, members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, spanning the period 1985-2006.
As suggested by McGillivray and White (1993), we use, as dependent variable, Aid Commitments rather than disbursements 10 and we include, among the explanatory variables, indicators of recipient needs (which reflect the altruistic motive for giving aid) and donors' strategic/economic interests.
Most donors target a selected group of recipients, giving a positive amount of aid to some countries and nothing to others. Our dependent variable, Aid Commitments relative to GDP, is therefore only partly continuous with positive probability mass at zero. Since the dependent variable is left censored, the estimation method that is most commonly used in models of aid allocation is the Tobit model 11 . This method takes into account the endogenous selection of recipients, and estimates the determinants of the aid commitments/GDP ratio in one step.
The most relevant indicator of recipient needs is a country's per capita income, measured at international prices, GDP per capita. We expect this variable to have a negative sign for those donors who target their transfers according to recipients needs.
In order to test whether donor countries value the level of democracy as an important goal of aid assistance, we also include in our regressions the Index of Civil Liberty by the Freedom House, labeled Democracy 12 .
Donors' strategic and economic interests are measured using a series of variables that reflect historical or economic ties between donor and recipient countries. The variable Colony is a dummy indicating whether the recipient country was a colony or was administered as a protectorate by the donor prior to independence 13 . Former colonial powers usually have remaining political, economic, cultural and other interests in their former colonies. In the case of the United States, we consider two other dummy variables Egypt and Israel that take into account the high volume of aid traditionally granted to these countries. Moreover, always for the USA, we include a measure of political proximity labeled UN, which measures the voting behavior of the country in the UN General Assembly, i.e. the percentage of times in which the country has voted in line with the United States. Some degree of donors' strategic/economic interest may also be reflected by the variable Military Expenditure, which is measured as the amount of military expenditures of the recipient scaled by GDP. A last important variable reflecting donors' economic interests is the variable Trade, which measures bilateral trade, and is given by the sum of the exports and imports between a donor and recipient country 14 .
As we argued in the previous pages, the possibility to capture private benefits may significantly undermine the success of development projects, and therefore, donors that are particularly interested in the results of their efforts will pay close attention to this phenomenon, which we measure in this paper through the variable Corruption. Following the existing literature, we use the index provided by the International Country Risk Guide(ICRG) 15 .
Although it doesn't have a clear interpretation in terms of altruism, strategic/economic motivations or efficiency considerations, we include among the regressors also the variable Population, which is a measure of the size of the country. By doing this, we follow the existing literature which has found, in many cases, the presence of a significant population bias in aid allocation.
The costs for a donor of providing aid are proxied, in this analysis, by the variable Budget Deficit, which is simply the annual government surplus of every single donor as a percentage of GDP. The higher is the deficit (i.e. the lower is the surplus), the higher the competing claims for government resources inside the donor country and the lower the amount of funds available for foreign aid assistance, i.e. the higher is the cost of providing aid.
liberties checklists determines the political rights and civil liberties ratings. Each point total corresponds to a rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom.
The Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy follows directly from the model considered in section 2. In the three equilibria that lead the donor to deliver a positive level of aid (i.e. equilibrium 1, 2 and 3) the relationship between aid and corruption can be described as follows: equilibrium 1 identifies a situation where the amount of aid allocated is not affected by the level of corruption. If donors do not perceive the existence of a meaningful moral hazard problem and simply equate the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of aid, without imposing any incentive constraint, then aid should not depend on corruption. Therefore, a non significant relationship between the Aid/GDP variable and the corruption indicator, according to our model, signals that a donor is allocating foreign aid following the first equilibrium of the model.
A positive relationship between aid and corruption is consistent either with the second equilibrium or with the third equilibrium when λ > 1/2 16 . In the former case, donors use the amount of aid as an incentive mechanism, i.e. they allow some corruption to compensate local elites for their effort and to induce them to work toward the success of development projects. In the second case, donors do not impose any incentive mechanism but are simply allowing local elites to capture a large part of the aid flows for strategic or economic reasons. A positive relationship between aid and corruption therefore, could signal two very different motivations: an attempt to induce type I agents to work in a direction that would ultimately benefit also type II agents, or simply the use of aid as a foreign policy instrument.
A negative relationship instead between the variable Aid/GDP and the variable Corruption is compatible only with the third equilibrium of the model when λ < 1/2. In this case, since the donors are extremely concerned on the welfare of the poor, as corruption increases they will react reducing the level of aid allocated and that, in any case, would not have reached the people in need.
The Determinants of the Aid Allocation
Our empirical work consists in running separately a set of Tobit regressions for every donor country included in the sample. The analysis differs from the one performed by Alesina-Weder (2002) in few important respects: we use as a dependent variable Aid/GDP instead of aid per capita and a larger set of regressors. We consider also a larger time span, which allows us to compare changes in trends of the aid-corruption relationship over two decades : 1985-1995 and 1996-2006 .
For every donor country we estimate two different equations. The first follows a specification similar to the one provided by Alesina and Weder. In this equation, Aid Commitments/GDP are regressed on GDP per capita, Population, Democracy, Corruption, Trade, Colony and, for the USA, we add also the variables UN to capture strategic interests and the dummies for Egypt and Israel. With respect to the Alesina and Weder specification we add also the variable Budget Deficit, in order to include an indicator of 16 Remember that the qualitative index of corruption that we are using in the paper associates higher points (from 1 to 6) to less corrupt countries.
the opportunity cost associated to aid giving. In the second specification, we include the variable Military Expenditure. We consider this variable in a separate regression, since the series are not complete, and its introduction often implies a significant reduction in the number of observations.
The results of our Tobit regressions are reported in tables (2)- (9). Consistently with the aid allocation literature, all countries show a mix of altruistic motives and strategic/economic considerations in their aid allocation choices. The variable GDP per capita is negative and significant in all the periods taken into account, showing that all donors, consistently, tend to give a larger amount of aid to poorer recipients 17 .
At the same time, also the variable Democracy is highly significant in most equations and almost always enters with a negative sign, the only exceptions being Finland for the total sample, Norway for the period 96-06 and Italy for the period 85-95. The sign and the significance of the relationship between Democracy and the level of aid indicates that donors tend to favor democratic countries and, sometimes, use aid an instrument to promote democracy in the developing world. According to our results, this tendency has increased in the last decade. As was recently argued by Dollar and Levin (2004) , since democracy is associated to better institutions and a healthier economic/social environment, this could also indicate that donors tend to select countries that undertake good policies.
There is, however, a clear bias, in aid flows, towards those recipients that have strong political, historical and economic ties with donors. Except for Japan (see table (3)) and for Italy (see table (8)) the coefficient of the variable Colony, when included in the regression, is positive and significant. The USA give a strong preference to Israel and Egypt in the period 1985-1995, while the sign of these dummies is negative in the other two sub-samples (see table (4) ). Unlike what was found in earlier studies, the variable UN is not significant. Also economic ties play a key role in determining aid allocation decisions: for all donors and for the majority of the equations, the coefficient of the variable Trade is positive and highly significant.
An indicator of non-altruistic motives for giving aid is the share of military expenditure relative to the GDP of the country. This variable turns out, however, to be not very significant in most regressions. The only exceptions are given by Spain and the USA. In this last case, however, Military Expenditure is positively related to aid only in the period 85-95 (Cold War era) and for the total sample, showing that apparently USA policies have increased in selectivity towards the last decade. Surprisingly, a positive relationship between aid and military expenditure can be found also for two Scandinavian countries: Finland and Norway.
The aid decision is significantly affected also by the situation of the public budget, which represents a measure of the cost, for the donor country, of giving aid. In many cases and in many periods it seems that an increase in the Budget Deficit had a negative effect on aid. As we can see from our tables, i.e. (2)- (9), the sign of the coefficient is negative for all countries but positive for Denmark, Finland and Norway. This is because these donors have historically run a budget surplus and, being the variable positive, it turned out to be positively associated to the volume of aid. The well known bias toward less populated countries still applies, exception made for USA and Finland.
The Effect of Corruption on Aid
When we analyze whether donors in allocating aid take into account the level of corruption in the recipient country, our results show instead wide differences among donors. Scandinavian countries tend to give more aid to less corrupt recipients 18 . Looking at equations 1 and 2 for the whole sample from tables (5) and (6), we notice that the coefficient of the variable Corruption is always positive and significant. Recall that, according to our model, such a relationship is an unambiguous indicator of what we label as "altruistic" behavior. Donors that know they can hardly affect corruption through their aid policies but care about recipients needs, since they are aware that the higher the level of corruption the fewer resources will flow to the poor, tend to privilege less corrupt countries. This result, therefore, is consistent with the popular view (see Dollar, 2000 and Nunnenkamp, 2006 ) that considers generally the aid policies of Scandinavian countries oriented more to recipient needs than conditioned by strategic-economic interests. Interestingly, this attitude is also shared by Germany, in the whole sample and in the first subperiod, and by Japan, in the total sample and in the second subperiod.
The level of corruption, instead, does not affect aid allocation decisions in the UK, Australia and the Netherlands. In the regressions relative to these countries the variable corruption is never significant, showing that their aid policies are well captured by the first equilibrium of our model, where aid allocation decisions are mainly driven by factors concerning donors' preferences rather than recipients' behavior.
Although it has been widely recognized that corruption is dysfunctional to the attaintment of Millennium Development Goals, there is a third group of donors that seems to give more aid to more corrupt recipients: USA, Italy, France, Spain and Canada. As far as the USA are concerned, the variable Corruption is significant in both equations for the whole sample and in one of the two equations in each period. The level of significance, however, is not very high. If we instead consider Italy, we find that Corruption is very significant in all the specifications, except for one of the two equations concerning the period 85-95. For the other three donors, the aid-corruption relationship is not very strong: the variable has always a negative sign, but is significant in only one of the two equations concerning the whole sample for Spain and Canada, and in one equation in the decade 95-06 for France.
As we explained above, these results could signal two possible equilibria. One, in which donors use aid to provide the right incentives to local elites; the other one, where donors cannot impose an incentive mechanism. In this case, since they highly value the welfare of the elite for strategic-economic reasons, the level of aid will be increasing on corruption. It is not easy, a priori, to discriminate between these two hypotheses. Notice, however, that if we consider the regressions relative to USA and Spain, we find that aid is also significantly and positively affected by the level of military expenditures, while in the regressions concerning Italy, we find that this country is the only one that seems to have favored, in the period 85-95, non democratic countries. These considerations lead us to think that maybe strategic-economic considerations have strongly conditioned the aid-corruption relationships for these donors.
Canada, instead, shows a negative relationship between military expenditures and aid, and both Canada and France (in the decade 95-06) have a preference for democratic countries. For these donors, the fact that aid is given to more corrupt countries to induce the elites to work toward the success of development projects cannot be excluded.
Conclusions
In this paper, we focus on the determinants of the relationship between aid and corruption. We consider a static principal-agent model, where a donor faces the problem of giving aid to a recipient country in which the phenomenon of corruption is widely spread. Our model suggests that there can be four types of equilibria. In the first one, the moral hazard problem is not perceived as relevant and foreign aid depends only on the preferences of the donor. In the second equilibrium, moral hazard is a relevant issue and the donor decides to use aid transfers to reduce the incentives for local elites to divert resources from their intended use. In the third and fourth equilibria, the set of incentive compatible contracts is empty. Donors know that they cannot use aid to provide the right incentives and therefore, react to corruption according to their individual preferences: a donor which is driven by strategic or economic interests may simply use aid to obtain the support of the local elites. A donor, instead, highly concerned that aid reaches the people in need can decide to allocate more aid to less corrupt recipients or even to ration aid to the highly corrupt ones. We use the implied signs of the aidcorruption relationship to discriminate empirically the various motivations behind aid allocation. Our empirical results allow us to group donors into three categories. The first one, mainly composed of Scandinavian countries plus Germany and Japan, that gives less aid to more corrupt recipients. As a consequence, we label them as altruistic donors. The second category of donors (Australia, the UK and the Netherlands) does not seem to be influenced by the level of corruption in allocating foreign aid.
For the remaining donors (Canada, Italy, France, Spain and the USA) instead, the aid-corruption relationship is positive: although with different intensities, these donors tend to favor more corrupt recipients. In order to discriminate between the second and the third equilibrium of the model, we look at the impact of other regressors: for USA and Spain, the overall pictures suggest that strategic/economic consideration have strongly conditioned aid allocation policies. For Canada and France, the other regressors show that the use of aid as an incentive mechanism cannot be excluded.
Summing up, even though the recent debate on foreign aid and the Millennium Development Goals emphasizes the importance of making a more efficient use of funds, we do not find that aid is used as an instrument to fight corruption. For the majority of the donors included in our sample, the standard dichotomy between recipient needs and strategic/economic interests still holds.
A Appendix Proof 1. Consider first the case B(γ, b) > 0 and g
First, notice that if the incentive compatibility constraint (10) is satisfied, then:
which implies that the individual rationality constraint (11) is also satisfied. Assume, now, condition (8) is satisfied and that the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding. In this case, an optimal contract is a solution to problem (9)- (12) and, since we have assumed that the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding, the solution to the maximization problem is given by (15) .
Substituting (15) into (10) and rearranging, we obtain: (15) is an equilibrium, since the incentive compatibility constraint will never be binding. Notice also that in this case, given that we have assumed g
will always be satisfied.
Suppose, now, that after substituting (15) into (10), we get f
In this case, contract (15) does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (10) and therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint must be binding. The equilibrium contract can be found solving for the aid transfer that satisfies (10) as an equality, which implies that equation (16) is an equilibrium of the model. Notice that, since f
, this contract also satisfies condition (8) . Consider now the case B(γ, λ) ≤ 0 and/or g
In this case, either the set of incentive compatible contracts is empty or the donor prefers that type I agents choose the low level of effort. The optimal contract will be the solution to problem (13)- (14) . If 
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